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Searching the World Over: Applying the
Exclusionary Rule to Searches of
Aliens by U.S. Agents
Richard Ward*
In a housing project in the Bronx, New York, agents of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) arrest an alleged
drug dealer. The suspect, a United States citizen, is transported to
a holding facility in downtown Manhattan. Later that night, well
after midnight, DEA agents return to the suspect's apartment,
enter it, and begin an extensive search for evidence of illegal drug
sales. The apartment is ransacked. A file cabinet containing per-
sonal documents is opened. The agents begin to search the file,
but because the hour is late, they decide to take the whole file
from the apartment to search through at their leisure. All of this
occurs without a search warrant or the exigent circumstances that
would justify a warrantless search.
Any evidence found during this search would be inadmissible
against the suspect at trial because such a warrantless search vio-
lated the suspect's fourth amendment protection against unreason-
able searches.1 This is exactly the type of warrantless search for
which the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule was devised.2
But what if the facts are changed slightly? The search is still
* B.A., Carleton College, 1985; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School,
1990.
1. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States Supreme Court held
that evidence obtained from a defendant's home by the police without a search war-
rant and without consent cannot be used against the criminal defendant at trial. Id.
at 660. A search warrant may not be necessary if police can show that exigent cir-
cumstances required the warrantless search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971).
The fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi-
olated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath and affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. In Mapp, police conducted a warrantless search of defendant's home. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644 (1961). Id. at 644. During the search, police discovered
"obscene materials." Id. at 645. The defendant's conviction for possession of the
materials was overturned by the Supreme Court because the search was conducted
without a warrant. Id. at 660.
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conducted by DEA agents. The search is still late at night. The
search is still warrantless and without exigent circumstances. The
suspect is still being tried in a United States federal court. The
differences are that the search occurs in Mexico and the suspect is
a Mexican citizen. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, it is
not clear whether the evidence in this search will be admissible
against the Mexican suspect. These two situations are almost iden-
tical, but their judicial outcomes may be quite different. The
American defendant will be afforded fourth amendment protec-
tions. The Mexican defendant, who will be tried on the same
charge in the same United States court, may not be allowed to in-
voke those same protections. Such a result is unjust and demeans
the judicial process.
This article demonstrates why evidence illegally obtained in
foreign searches by United States agents should not be used
against alien defendants in prosecutions in the United States. It be-
gins by examining the purposes of the exclusionary rule, purposes
that remain valid despite the criticism of some legal scholars. It
then reviews Supreme Court decisions that address the extraterri-
torial application of the Constitution and lower federal court deci-
sions that consider the application of constitutional protections to
aliens abroad. This analysis of case law ends with an examination
of a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez,3 holding suppression of evidence appropriate
when United States agents conduct an unconstitutional search
abroad.4 Finally, this article analyzes the policy arguments sup-
porting application of the exclusionary rule in such cases. Specifi-
cally, it considers how the use of illegally obtained evidence may
undermine the exclusionary rule in the United States and the posi-
tive results that would obtain from increased control over United
States agents abroad.
I. Purpose of the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
To understand why application of the exclusionary rule
should be required when United States agents conduct an illegal
foreign search, we must first examine the history and purposes of
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule
suppresses evidence obtained in a search violating the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution.5 As originally con-
3. 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-
1353).
4. Id. at 1230.
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
[Vol. 7:489
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ceived by the United States Supreme Court, the rule provided a
remedy to the criminal defendant whose constitutional rights had
been violated 6 and acted as a deterrent against unconstitutional
government searches.7 The rule also preserved the "judicial integ-
rity" of courts by preventing their participation in police
misconduct.8
In more recent years, the Supreme Court has concentrated
on the deterrent effects of the rule, weighing the benefits of apply-
ing the rule against the costs to society of suppressing evidence.9
The Court has held that when the exclusionary rule would not act
as a deterrent against police misconduct, it should not be applied.'0
The exclusionary rule serves several important objectives.
First, the rule protects innocent people and fosters social goals by
discouraging police from conducting illegal searches:
The exclusionary rule protects innocent people by eliminating
the incentive to search and seize unreasonably. So long as a
policeman knows that any evidence he obtains in violation of
the fourth amendment will not help secure a conviction he has
less reason to violate the amendment and more reason to un-
derstand it.11
Thus, the exclusionary rule serves to protect all citizens' privacy
interests.
The rule also engenders respect for the law. A refusal to pro-
vide a remedy for violations of the fourth amendment would signal
tacit approval of illegal searches by allowing illegal activity to oc-
cur without negative consequences.12 This in turn would hurt,
rather than help, the cause of law enforcement:
When courts admit evidence obtained by unlawful police con-
duct they lend color and countenance in some measure to law-
lessness. The consequence is to undermine respect not only for
the courts but for the law of which the courts are custodians.
Respect for the law is the sine qua non of effective law en-
forcement. A widespread lack of it among Americans is, con-
versely, the most serious impediment to the work of the police;
it leads American juries sometimes to reject or discount prose-
cution evidence precisely because of a suspicion that it was ob-
tained by questionable means. Thus, dubious police methods
6. Id. at 657-58.
7. Id. at 656.
8. Id. at 659.
9. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). In Leon the Court held that
the exclusionary rule should not apply when the police act in good faith reliance on
a warrant. Id.
10. Id. at 906.
11. Arnold Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Inno-
cent, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1229, 1266-67 (1983).
12. Alan Barth, The Price of Liberty 99 (1961).
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defeat the very purpose for which they are pursued.13
No one is pleased when a criminal goes free because relevant evi-
dence must be suppressed. But the alternative is to sanction police
misconduct by admitting the evidence, thereby encouraging viola-
tions of privacy and engendering disrespect for the law.
Some commentators have advocated elimination of the exclu-
sionary rule altogether. 14 One has suggested that the rule should
not apply when the crime involved is serious.15 The rule has been
attacked because it may exclude relevant, incriminating evidence
and, thus, allow guilty defendants to go free.16 Given this result,
arguments for the elimination of the exclusionary rule, on the sur-
face, seem persuasive. After all, a guilty criminal defendant would
wish to exclude as much incriminating evidence as possible. On its
face, the exclusionary rule may appear to protect only the guilty.
Such a view, however, ignores the rule's benefits, which include
protecting the innocent, discouraging police misconduct, and en-
gendering respect for the law.
The Supreme Court also recognizes these benefits. Although
limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule,17 the Court has gener-
ally embraced the rule's underlying legitimacy.' 8 The exclusion-
ary rule, therefore, remains a respected sanction which ensures
that "[t]he efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment . . . are not to be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffer-
ing which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land."19 The exclusionary rule continues to be a valid
13. Id. at 99-100.
14. See, e.g., Steven Schlesinger, Exclusionary Injustice: The Problem of Ille-
gally Obtained Evidence (1977); Malcolm Wilkey, Enforcing the Fourth Amend-
ment by Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule (1982).
15. John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exculsionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027,
1046 (1974). One modification Kaplan proposes is exempting cases of "treason, espi-
onage, murder, armed robbery, and kidnaping by organized groups" from the exclu-
sionary rule's application. Id.
16. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (limiting the circumstances
under which fourth amendment claims may be raised in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (illegally seized evidence may
be used in federal civil tax proceeding); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974) (grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions based on illegally
obtained evidence).
18. As the majority said in Leon, "The Court has, to be sure, not seriously ques-
tioned, 'in the absence of a more efficacious sanction, the continued application of
the rule to suppress evidence from the [prosecution's] case where a Fourth Amend-
ment violation has been substantial and deliberate.'" 468 U.S. at 908-09 (quoting
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)).
19. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 393 (1914)).
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and effective sanction for unconstitutional government conduct.
II. Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Foreign Searches
A. Supreme Court Cases
Though the exclusionary rule plays an important role in
criminal adjudication in this country, the United States Supreme
Court has yet to consider its application to searches occurring
outside the United States when the defendant is a non-resident
alien prosecuted in a United States court.
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court generally held that the protections granted by the United
States Constitution did not extend beyond the territorial borders
of the United States. In In re Ross,20 the Court ruled that because
the Constitution was established for the United States and not for
foreign countries, it could "have no operation in another coun-
try."21 In Ross, an American seaman, John Ross, was convicted by
an American consular tribunal in Japan of murdering an Ameri-
can on a ship in a Japanese harbor.22 Ross claimed he had been
denied his constitutional right to a jury trial,23 but the Supreme
Court upheld his conviction on the grounds that the Constitution's
protections "apply only to citizens and others within the United
States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged offences com-
mitted elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners
abroad." 24 The Court in Ross thus restricted the reach of the Con-
stitution to United States territory.
Although the language of the Ross decision appeared to to-
tally block application of the Constitution overseas, later cases of-
fered some protections abroad. A little over a decade after the
Ross decision, the Court concluded that though an American de-
fendant could be denied a trial by jury in the Philippines, he was
still entitled to a "fair trial."25 United States citizens abroad could
be denied the protections of specific provisions of the Constitution,
but they could not be denied fundamental "due process." 26
This strict territorial view of the Constitution began to erode
in the 1950's. In Reid v. Covert,27 the wife of a United States Air
20. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
21. Id. at 464.
22. Id. at 454.
23. Id. at 463.
24. Id. at 464 (citing Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181 (1891)).
25. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146 (1904).
26. See Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution-Unalienable
Rights?, 72 Va. L. Rev. 649, 655-56 (1986).
27. 354 U.S. 1, 3 (1956).
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Force sergeant killed her husband at an air base in England. A
military tribunal in England found her guilty of murder. 28 She
challenged the tribunal's decision on the ground that the Constitu-
tion forbids the trying of civilians in military court.29 A divided
Supreme Court reversed the military tribunal's decision, rejecting
at the outset "the idea that when the United States acts against cit-
izens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights."30 Justice
Black, writing for the plurality, asserted that the Constitution does
apply:
The United States is entirely a creature of the constitution....
It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed
by the Constitution. When the government reaches out to
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of
Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect
his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he
happens to be in another land.31
Dismissing the Ross case as "a relic from a different era" resting
on a "fundamental misconception,"32 Black explained that the
Ross ruling that the Constitution cannot extend abroad had "long
since been directly repudiated by numerous cases." 33 Black viewed
efforts to limit constitutional protections to citizens in the United
States as a "very dangerous doctrine" that threatened to "under-
mine the basis" of the United States government. 3 4 Reid thus sig-
naled that the strict territorial approach of Ross was no longer
valid and that constitutional protections extended overseas.
The protection given to United States citizens by the Consti-
tution has since been found to include application of the exclusion-
ary rule to foreign searches of United States citizens by United
States agents. In United States v. Stonehill,35 Philippine govern-
ment agents raided the business offices of two Americans living in
the Philippines. The agents were searching for evidence for a de-
portation proceeding.36 Later, evidence seized in the raid was pro-
vided to United States agents for use in an Internal Revenue
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 5-6.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 12 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1921); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1900); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 134 (1851); Best
v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir. 1950); Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d
961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950); Turney v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 457, 464 (Ct. Cl. 1953)).
34. Id. at 14.
35. 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968).
36. Id. at 740-41.
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Service fraud investigation of the defendant, Stonehill.37 The de-
fendant moved to suppress the documents on the ground that they
had been illegally seized.38 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the evidence could be suppressed if United
States agents had "so substantially participated in a raid by foreign
officials so as to convert that raid into a joint venture between the
United States and the foreign government." 39 Thus, United States
courts will apply the exclusionary rule to evidence seized from
United States citizens by United States agents on foreign soil. The
only requirements are that an unconstitutional search occur, and
United States agents play a substantial role in the search.
Though the idea that constitutional protections are restricted
to United States soil has been thoroughly repudiated,40 the exten-
sion of constitutional protection to non-citizens outside the United
States has not automatically followed. It is generally conceded
that the Constitution applies to non-citizens only if they are living
in the United States.41 In Wong Wing v. United States,42 the
Supreme Court held that "all persons living within the territory of
the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the
fifth and sixth] amendments." 4 3 In United States ex rel. Turner v.
Williams,44 the Court observed that once aliens enter the United
States they are protected by the fifth and sixth amendments. 45 In
Matthews v. Diaz,46 the Court explained that invidious discrimina-
tion against resident aliens was a violation of their fifth and four-
teenth amendment rights.47 Even in In re Ross,48 which held that
constitutional protections do not extend beyond the nation's bor-
ders, acknowledged that "citizens and others within the United
States, or who are brought here for trial" are entitled to fifth and
sixth amendment protection.49 In these cases, the Supreme Court
37. Id. at 742.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 743. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that U.S. offi-
cials had not substantially participated in the search by the Philippine government
and therefore the evidence could not be suppressed. Id. at 746.
40. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1956); Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 913
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 751 (9th Cir. 1969).
41. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1982); United States ex. rel. Turner v.
Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 291 (1904); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238
(1896); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
42. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
43. Id. at 238.
44. 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
45. Id. at 291.
46. 426 U.S. 67 (1982).
47. Id. at 77.
48. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
49. Id. at 464.
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has been willing to grant constitutional protection to aliens; alien-
age alone cannot justify denying those rights.
United States courts, however, have been more reluctant to
apply the full panoply of rights to aliens subjected to violations by
United States agents overseas. Although the Supreme Court has
rarely addressed this issue, in Johnson v. Eisentrager,5 0 the Court
appeared to reject extending constitutional protections to aliens
abroad. In Eisentrager, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a writ
of habeas corpus to inquire into the confinement of enemy aliens
captured and prosecuted in China by the United States Army for
war crimes.5 1 The Court explained that extending the Constitution
to protect aliens in the United States did not require extending
protections to aliens abroad because it "was the alien's presence
within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to
act." 52 Though it seems that Eisentrager would bar extending con-
stitutional protections to aliens, it should not be read so broadly.
The Eisentrager Court considered a number of factors in ad-
dition to the defendants' alienage. The Court also considered their
status as enemies of the United States and as prisoners of war who
were at all times incarcerated outside the United States.5 3 The
Court narrowed the ultimate issue in the case to "one of [the] ju-
risdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-a-vis military au-
thorities in dealing with enemy aliens overseas." 54 Given the
numerous extenuating factors weighed by the Court and the nar-
row issue finally decided, the Eisentrager opinion does not bar the
assertion of constitutional protection by aliens abroad.55
As the previous cases illustrate, the Supreme Court has re-
jected the notion that the United States Constitution only applies
in the United States. But the Court has yet to directly address the
issue of whether the Constitution extends to aliens overseas.
B. Lower Court Decisions
Some lower federal courts have spoken to the issue of the ap-
plication of constitutional protections to aliens when the United
States acts abroad. These courts have acknowledged that constitu-
tional protections extend to aliens abroad. These cases are impor-
tant examples of how an expansive reading of the fourth
50. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
51. Id. at 763-65.
52. Id. at 771.
53. Id. at 777-78.
54. Id. at 765.
55. See Note, supra note 26, at 656 n.40.
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amendment is necessary to protect aliens from overreaching by
United States agents.
In Toscanino v. United States,56 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that an alien may invoke the fourth amend-
ment prohibition against illegal searches and seizures conducted by
the United States government even if the illegal search occurs
abroad.57 In Toscanino, an Italian citizen, Francisco Toscanino,
suspected of narcotics violations, alleged that he had been ab-
ducted by United States agents in Uruguay, tortured and brought
to the United States against his will.58 Toscanino also claimed that
the United States agents had obtained incriminating evidence
against him through the use of illegal electronic surveillance.59
The court ordered an evidentiary hearing in which Toscanino's al-
legations could be investigated: 60
[W]hen an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within
the jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over his per-
son represents the fruits of the government's exploitation of
its own misconduct . . .in violation of the fourth amendment
... [and, therefore,] the government should as a matter of fun-
damental fairness be obligated to return him to his status quo
ante.61
The court relied on the fact that the government's behavior in the
case "shocks the conscience." 62 The "shocks the conscience" test is
applied when police behavior is so egregious that evidence ob-
tained as a result of the behavior must be suppressed.63 The Tos-
canino court extended that principle to encompass outrageous
police conduct that could bar prosecution altogether.6 4
The Toscanino court also ruled that Toscanino could invoke
the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches
in response to the alleged illegal wiretapping.65 The court rea-
soned that "an alien may invoke the [f]ourth [a]mendment's pro-
tection against an unreasonable search conducted in the United
States"66 and "[n]o sound basis is offered in support of a different
rule with respect to aliens who are the victims of unconstitutional
56. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 280.
58. Id. at 268.
59. Id. at 268.
60. Id. at 281.
61. Id. at 275.
62. Id. at 273 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
63. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
64. 500 F.2d at 274.
65. Id. at 280-81.
66. Id. at 280 (citing Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971)).
1989]
Law and Inequality
action abroad, at least where the government seeks to exploit the
fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding against the
alien in the United States." 67 Thus, the Toscanino court seemed to
imply that, at least when the United States government seeks to
use tainted evidence against an alien within the United States, the
fourth amendment works to exclude the evidence. 68
Because Toscanino involved United States government be-
havior that "shocked the conscience" of the court, it is arguable
that the holding should apply only when government behavior is
particularly outrageous. A Second Circuit decision following soon
after Toscanino, United States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler,69 implies
such a limitation. In Lujan, the court limited the Toscanino hold-
ing to cases involving egregious government conduct. 70 Lujan was
an Argentine citizen who alleged he was lured into Bolivia, ar-
rested by agents hired by the United States, and placed on a plane
bound for New York, where he was arrested and prosecuted for
drug violations.71 Lujan challenged the manner in which he was
brought to the United States and argued that because he was ille-
gally abducted, the district court did not have jurisdiction over
him.72 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's refusal to divest itself of jurisdiction, arguing that,
unlike Toscanino, Lujan had not alleged any outrageous govern-
ment conduct justifying divestment.7 3 The court argued that "not
every violation by prosecution or police is so egregious that... [it]
requires nullification of the indictment." 74 Thus, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit seems to have limited Toscanino to its
facts, requiring outrageous government conduct to divest the
court's jurisdiction.
Despite the holding in Lujan, a question remains as to
whether outrageous government conduct is necessary to trigger
other constitutional protections. Because Lujan did not involve a
fourth amendment violation, the court did not consider whether
outrageous government conduct is required for the Toscanino
holding that aliens abroad are entitled to fourth amendment pro-
tection to apply. This remains an open question after Lujan.
The fourth amendment has been held to extend to aliens who
67. Id.
68. See Note, supra note 26, at 668-69.
69. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
70. Id. at 66.
71. Id. at 63.
72. Id.




are subject to unconstitutional searches on the high seas. In
United States v. Cadena,7 5 the Coast Guard boarded a vessel sus-
pected of carrying a large quantity of marijuana and arrested thir-
teen of the ship's Columbian crew members. A search of the
vessel turned up approximately fifty-four tons of marijuana.7 6 The
Columbians challenged the search as unconstitutional because the
Coast Guard did not have a search warrant. 77 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the search was proper be-
cause there were exigent circumstances obviating the need for a
warrant.78 However, the court acknowledged that fourth amend-
ment protections extend to aliens at sea7 9 and concluded that the
protections of the fourth amendment are "not limited to domestic
vessels or to our citizens; once we subject foreign vessels or aliens
to criminal prosecution, they are entitled to the equal protection of
all our laws, including the [f]ourth [a]mendment."o In other
words, when the United States government acts abroad, the Con-
stitution applies to any resulting prosecution within the United
States.
Another federal court has applied sixth amendment protec-
tions to aliens overseas. A recent opinion of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held that constitutional
protections apply to overseas interrogations of aliens by United
States agents. In United States v. Yunis,81 the court ruled that a
confession made by an alien abroad to United States agents is not
admissible if the alien has not voluntarily and knowingly waived
the sixth amendment right to counsel.8 2 In Yunis, Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) agents captured Yunis, a Lebanese citizen,
in international waters.83 Yunis was suspected of terrorist activi-
75. 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978).
76. Id. at 1255-56.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1262-63.
79. Id. at 1262.
80. Id. The Fifth Circuit later disapproved of the Cadena court's endorsement
of requiring search warrants for searches of vessels at sea. United States v. Wil-
liams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087 (5th Cir. 1980). But the Williams court based its disa-
greement with the Cadena court on the difference between searches of national
vessels and searches of vehicles and buildings on land. Id. at 1087. The court as-
serted that "It]he Constitution mandates a less restrictive standard to govern
searches on the high seas than searches on land because of the substantial and long-
recognized differences between nautical vessels and vehicles and buildings on
land." Id. Thus the Williams court did not question the Cadena court's reasoning
that fourth amendment protections should extend to aliens. The Williams court
based its criticism on the differences between land searches and sea searches.
81. 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 929.
83. Id. at 911.
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ties.8 4 While transporting Yunis to the United States for trial, FBI
agents aboard the ship extracted a confession from him.85 The dis-
trict court ruled that Yunis had not voluntarily and knowingly
waived his right to counsel because he was suffering from two bro-
ken wrists and seasickness during the interrogation.8 6 The court
also noted that the Arabic translation of the Miranda warnings
was faulty and that the FBI had not recorded the interrogation. 87
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
the district court's holding on the ground that Yunis had know-
ingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.8 8 But the court
acknowledged at the outset that fifth amendment protections ex-
tended to Yunis even though he was an alien and the interrogation
occurred outside the United States.8 9
As Toscanino, Cadena, and Yunis illustrate, lower federal
courts have been inclined to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of the Constitution, even if the victim of the violation is an alien
and even if the violation occurs overseas.
C. United States Constitution: Contract or Natural Rights?
The basis for a limited extension of constitutional protections
to aliens abroad rests on the assumption that aliens, like United
States citizens, have certain natural rights that cannot be infringed
upon by the United States government. The government is re-
stricted by the Constitution, which instead of endowing rights
upon people, simply recognizes those natural rights and enjoins
the government from infringing upon them.9 0
Some commentators have suggested that a natural rights
view of the Constitution runs contrary to a "traditional view of the
Constitution as a compact between the people of the United States
and its government, creating enforceable rights and duties running
between each of the parties.' '91 This approach stems from the view
that the Constitution was created as a social contract through
84. Id. at 912-13.
85. Id. at 914.
86. Id. at 922-24.
87. Id. at 924-25.
88. United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 957.
90. Note, supra note 26, at 651-52; see also Louis Henkin, Rights: American and
Human, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 405 (1979); Louis Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 1582, 1584-90 (1981); Steven Burr, Immigration and the First
Amendment, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 1889, 1914 (1985).
91. Paul Stephan III, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of
Criminal Suspects, 20 Va. J. Int'l L. 777, 783 (1980) (citing The Federalist Nos. 39,
43-44 (James Madison) and No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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which the governed agreed to submit to the government's rule in
exchange for certain rights and liberties.92 This social contract be-
tween the governed and the government implies that aliens
outside the United States are necessarily excluded from constitu-
tional protection.9 3
Natural rights theorists, however, argue that the contractual
qualities of the Constitution do not justify limiting its protections
to residents of the United States.94 A purely contractual approach
to the Constitution is not consistent with the view that the Consti-
tution was meant to protect certain "unalienable" or "natural"
rights, rights that are basic to a "right to survival." 95 These rights
are common to all people and cannot be restricted solely to United
States residents.96 Our own Declaration of Independence reflects
this natural rights philosophy by stating that "all [persons] ... are
endowed by their Creator with certain Unalienable Rights, that
among these, are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. '97
Even if one accepts that the Constitution is a compact be-
tween citizens and their government, one may view it as a compact
by which the government is required to respect the rights of all
people, citizens and non-citizens alike.98 Thus, though the Consti-
tution does not necessarily apply everywhere, it must apply when-
ever and wherever the United States government acts. 99 Because
a natural rights interpretation of the Constitution views rights as
universal and unalienable, it allows an extension of constitutional
protections to aliens abroad. This view of constitutional rights re-
quires the United States government to treat all people equally re-
gardless of nationality.
D. Explicit Extension to Aliens Abroad: United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez
The natural rights view of the Constitution is shared by the
majority in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,100 a recent Ninth
92. Id. at 783-84.
93. Id.; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir.
1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353).
But see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 749 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
94. Note, supra note 26, at 653.
95. Id. at 651-52.
96. Id. at 653.
97. Id. at 652 n.11 (citing The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
98. Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual
Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 11, 32 (1985).
99. Id.




Circuit opinion which concluded that aliens may assert fourth
amendment rights even if the violation of the alien's rights occurs
outside the United States. In Verdugo-Urquidez, a suspected drug
kingpin, Rene Verdugo-Urquidez, was arrested in Mexico and
transported to the United States for trial on drug charges.101
United States DEA officers then searched Verdugo-Urquidez's
Mexican home.102 The officers did not obtain a search warrant
and claimed no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless
search.103 The search was conducted after midnight, and the of-
ficers, realizing they would not have time to search all the defend-
ant's files at his home, simply gathered all the files together and
removed them.104
A divided panel of three judges ruled that the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule applied to the search. Because the search
was an unconstitutional, warrantless search, the evidence obtained
was properly suppressed by the district court. 0 5 The majority be-
gins by noting that the Constitution limits actions of United States
government agents abroad,106 citing extensively from Reid v. Cov-
ert.10 7 However, the court fails to mention that Reid applied spe-
cifically to United States citizens abroad and not to aliens.l0 8 The
court addresses this factual discrepancy by giving further reasons
why aliens abroad should be protected.
The court rejects the notion that the Constitution is a con-
tract that protects only those who are parties to it.109 While ac-
knowledging that there are several eighteenth and nineteenth
century Supreme Court opinions that refer to the Constitution as a
contract or compact, 1 0 the court notes that the historical evidence
101. Id. at 1216. Defendant Rene Verdugo-Urguidez has since been sentenced to
life imprisonment plus 240 years for his role in a separate incident involving the
death of a U.S. DEA agent, Enrique Camarena. See Los Angeles Times, Oct. 28,
1988, part 2, at 3, col. 1.
102. 856 F.2d at 1216-17.
103. Id. at 1226, 1230.
104. Id. at 1227.
105. Id. at 1230.
106. Id. at 1217-18.
107. 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
108. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353).
110. Id. at 1219 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall) 419, 471 (1793) (opin-
ion of Jay., C.J.) ("[T]he constitution of the United States is likewise a compact
made by the people of the United States, to govern themselves, as to general ob-
jects, in a certain manner."); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404
(1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The government of the Union ... is, emphatically and
truly, a government of the people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from
them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them,
and for their benefit."); League v. DeYoung, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 185, 202 (1850)
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supporting contract theory is "equivocal" and that other "sources
may be cited in support of a broader interpretation of the Consti-
tution."'' The court also notes that the cases cited in support of
contract theory do not address the problem of extraterritorial ap-
plication of the Constitution, and that more recent Supreme Court
cases extending constitutional protections to aliens in other con-
texts have made contract-based interpretations of the Constitution
obsolete. 112 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit distin-
guishes the early Supreme Court opinions that describe the Con-
stitution as a contract or compact.113 At issue in three of those
cases was the relationship between the federal government and
the states.114 Thus, those cases did not consider the extraterrito-
rial application of the Constitution and are not on point.115
Although Ross did address this issue, 116 it has since been overruled
by Reid v. Covert 1 7 and therefore does not control. 1 8
In examining the historical record, the court, while acknowl-
edging the historical support for contract theory,119 found equally
compelling evidence of the contrary philosophical belief underly-
ing the Constitution, the belief in the " 'natural rights' of [per-
sons]."120 Natural rights theory permeates early United States
political documents, including the Declaration of Independence,12 1
("The Constitution of the United States was made by, and for the protection of, the
people of the United States."); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) ("By the Consti-
tution a government is ordained and established 'for the United States of America,
and not for the countries outside of their limits .... The Constitution can have no
operation in another country.")).
111. Id. at 1219.
112. Id. at 1220-22.
113. See cases cited supra note 110.
114. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353). The Chisholm Court "considerled]
whether a state may be sued in the Supreme Court by an individual citizen of an-
other state." Id. at 1220-21 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
The McCulloch court "[held] that a state may not tax an instrumentality of the fed-
eral government created by Congress in pursuit of an enumerated power." Id. at
1221 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)). The De Young
court "[held] that a statute passed pursuant to the Constitution of the Republic of
Texas could not be challenged as unconstitutional because, until Texas joined the
Union, it was a sovereign power not bound by the United States Constitution. Id.
(citing League v. De Young, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 185 (1850)).
115. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1221.
116. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
118. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1221.
119. Id. at 1219.
120. Id.
121. The Declaration of Independence refers to "the laws of nature" and "ina-
lienable rights." Id. (citing Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776), reprinted in
Bernard Schwartz, 1 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 251-52 (1971)).
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state declarations of rights,122 and the writings of legal scholars. 123
Citing Justice Story, the court advocates natural rights theory over
contract theory:
It would, indeed, be an extraordinary use of language to con-
sider a declaration of rights in a constitution, and especially of
rights, which it proclaims to be "unalienable and indefeasible,"
to be a matter of contract, and resting on such a basis, rather
than a solemn recognition and admission of those rights, aris-
ing from the law of nature, and the gift of Providence, and in-
capable of being transferred or surrendered. 124
The Ninth Circuit's final argument in support of applying the
fourth amendment's protections to aliens abroad relies on the
Supreme Court cases in which the Constitution has been found to
apply to aliens within the United States.125 The court reasons that
because resident aliens are afforded protection under the United
States Constitution i 26 even though they are not United States citi-
zens, the Constitution cannot be viewed as a contract applying
solely to United States citizens. x27
The court also points out that the Supreme Court has also al-
lowed aliens constitutional protections without distinguishing be-
tween residents and visitors or those in the United States legally
or illegally.128 Because aliens are protected even though they may
122. United States v. Verdugo-Urguidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1988)
(citing Vermont Declaration of Rights (1977), reprinted in 1 Schwartz, supra note
121, at 319 (1971)), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353).
123. Id. at 1220 (citing 2 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law 1 (New
York 1827); 3 Bernard Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United
States: Rights of the Person (Volume 1), at 170 (1968); Thomas Grey, Origins of the
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought,
30 Stan. L. Rev. 843 (1978); Louis Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81 Colum. L.
Rev. 1582, 1584-90 (1981); Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Constitu-
tion-Unalienable Rights?, 72 Va. L. Rev. 649, 650 (1986)).
124. Id. (quoting 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States § 340, at 309 (Boston 1833)).
125. Id. at 1221-23.
126. The Supreme Court "extend[ed] fourteenth amendment [protection] to resi-
dent aliens because that amendment 'is not confined to the protection of citizens.' "
Id. at 1221 (quoting Yick Wo v. United States, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). "[Almong
the protections enjoyed by resident aliens are first, fifth, and fourteenth amend-
ment rights." Id. (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
concurring)). "[A] resident alien is a 'person' within the meaning of the fifth
amendment." Id. (citing Kwang Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)).
127. Id. at 1222.
128. Id. The fourteenth amendment applies "to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction [of the United States]." Id. (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886)). "Although [the] fifth and sixth amendments do not apply to trials con-
ducted in consular courts, their guarantees apply to 'citizens and others within the
United States, or who are brought here for trial.'" Id. (quoting In re Ross, 140 U.S.
453, 464 (1891)). "All persons within the territory of the United States are entitled
to the protection guaranteed by [the fifth and sixth] amendments." Id. (quoting
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)). The "fifth and sixth amend-
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only be visitors or may be in the United States illegally, extension
of protection to them cannot simply be explained as a quid pro
quo for "accepting the obligation of allegiance" to the United
States.129 Thus, the court argues, contract analysis is not adequate
to explain this extension of constitutional protection. 130
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejects the argu-
ment that fourth amendment protections should not extend to
aliens because the language of the fourth amendment is limited to
"the people" while other amendments that have been found to ex-
tend to aliens are not thus limited.131 The court chooses to inter-
pret the words "the people" broadly.132
The majority also cites Immigration & Naturalization Ser-
vice v. Lopez-Mendoza 133 as proof that the Supreme Court would
extend fourth amendment protection to illegal aliens.13 4 In Lopez-
Mendoza, the Court held that deportation hearings are not crimi-
nal proceedings and, therefore, the exclusionary rule is not appli-
cable to them.135 Eight of nine justices, however, agreed in dicta
that illegal aliens are protected by the fourth amendment.136 The
Verdugo-Urquidez majority finds incongruous the possibility that
the Supreme Court would apply the fourth amendment to illegal
aliens but deny protection to Verdugo-Urquidez, an alien in the
United States legally, but against his will.1 3 7
Having found contract theory wanting, the majority con-
cludes that the constitutional protections of the fourth amendment
are not limited to United States residents. 38 The court's argu-
ment in summary is: First, American citizens abroad are protected
ments protect aliens once they are in this country." Id. (citing United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 291 (1904)). "[AIll aliens within the jurisdiction of
the United States enjoy the protections of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
and may not be invidiously discriminated against by the federal government." Id.
(citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)). The Supreme Court "[held] that
under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, states may not
discriminate against illegal aliens by withholding free public education; [the Court]
reject[ed] [the] argument that illegal aliens are not within the jurisdiction of the
states or the federal government and therefore are not entitled to equal protection
rights." Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211 (1982)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1223.
132. Id.
133. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
134. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353).
135. 468 U.S. at 1038.
136. 856 F.2d at 1223 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Men-
doza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)).
137. Id. at 1223-24.
138. Id. at 1224.
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by the Constitution. Second, aliens, even those in this country ille-
gally, are protected in the United States. Third, contract theory is
an inadequate explanation of who receives constitutional protec-
tion. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent applying fourth
amendment protections to aliens living abroad.139
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the majority also had to decide
whether or not the United States government had substantially
participated in the search, thereby activating fourth amendment
protection under the Stonehill doctrine.140 After reviewing the
facts,141 the court concluded that this was clearly a United States
government operation and that United States participation was
substantial enough to activate the fourth amendment.142 The
court held that because the search was conducted without a search
warrant 143 and without exigent circumstances,14 4 the evidence ob-
tained in the search must be suppressed.145 The court noted that
although a search warrant would be a "dead-letter" in Mexico and
would give United States agents no authority to search,146 a war-
rant was required because the defendant was being prosecuted in
the United States.147
In his dissent, Judge Wallace rejects the majority's conclusion
that fourth amendment protections extend to aliens abroad.148 He
begins by acknowledging that because there is no Supreme Court
precedent addressing the issue of the fourth amendment rights of
aliens abroad, it is necessary to decide this case by examining the
language and history of the Constitution and the Supreme Court
cases addressing the rights of aliens in the United States.149 After
analyzing these sources, Wallace concludes that they do not confer
constitutional protections upon aliens abroad.150
139. See id. at 1230-31 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1225. For discussion of Stonehill doctrine, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 35-39.
141. The search was conducted to obtain evidence for a U.S. prosecution. United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S.
Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353). The decision to conduct the search was made by a
U.S. agent. Id. at 1226. There was a "low degree" of Mexican interest in the
search. Id. at 1227. The Mexican government allowed the DEA to keep all the evi-
dence found in the search. Id. at 1228. All the documents were kept by the DEA.
Id.
142. Id. at 1228.
143. Id. (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)).
144. Id. (citing Steagland v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981)).
145. Id. at 1230.
146. Id. at 1229-30.
147. Id. at 1230.
148. Id. at 1231 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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Wallace argues that because the fourth amendment provides
protection only to "the people" of the United States, the defendant
can be given protection only if he is "one of the people of the
United States."151 His conclusion is grounded in a view of the
Constitution as a "contract" or "compact" between the people of
the United States and their government.152
Wallace cites several sources in support of "contract theory."
He writes that the concept of social contract pervaded early Amer-
ican political philosophy,15 3 illustrated by the Mayflower Com-
pact 54 and the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut. 55 John
Locke, a highly influential political philosopher at the time of the
writing of the Constitution, viewed government as the result of a
"political compact."'156 The Declaration of Independence and some
early state constitutions saw government as an agreement between
the government and the governed. 5 7 Wallace asserts that the
Framers drew on all these sources when drafting the Constitu-
tion,158 and they understood that the Constitution was an agree-
ment by which "the people give up some degree of liberty in order
for them to secure others in return."'159 Wallace does not see natu-
ral rights and contract theory as mutually exclusive; the contract
simply requires that some "natural" rights be given up "to create a
central government capable of preserving the rest.' 60
Wallace also cites a number of Supreme Court cases to sup-
port his view of the Constitution as a contract. 61 These cases162
are rejected by the majority because they either did not address
the issue of the extraterritorial application of the Constitution163
or had been overruled.164 However, Wallace sees these cases as re-
flecting "an understanding of the Constitution as a blanket of pro-
tections covering only the 'people' who endowed their government
with its powers and who remain physically present within the
151. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1232 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
162. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); League v. DeYoung, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 185
(1850); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
163. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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[United States]."L65 The "people" are United States residents or
others within United States territory.
Wallace explains the application of the Constitution to aliens
within the United States as arising from the aliens' presence
within United States territory.166 This presence within the United
States requires the alien to shoulder certain obligations toward the
United States167 in exchange for which the alien receives constitu-
tional protections.168 Wallace concedes, however, that Verdugo-
Urquidez deserves the protections of the fifth and sixth amend-
ments, which have been held to apply "to 'all persons within the
territory of the United States.' "169 This application of constitu-
tional protections, however, does not include the fourth
amendment.
Because Verdugo-Urquidez is entitled to fourth amendment
protection only if he has attained "residence status" within the
United States, Wallace next considers whether he has attained
that status. He concludes that because the search complained of
occurred on foreign soil, Verdugo-Urquidez's presence in the
United States at the time has no significance. 170 He also points out
that while the majority cites several cases in which constitutional
protections are extended to aliens whose rights were violated in
the United States, the majority cites no authority supporting ex-
tension of protection to aliens when their rights were violated
outside the United States, as occurred in the instant case. 171 Thus,
Wallace concludes that constitutional protections cannot extend to
extraterritorial violations.172 Moreover, Wallace does not attach
any special significance to the fact that Verdugo-Urquidez was be-
ing prosecuted in a United States court when the search oc-
curred.173 He distinguishes or dismisses cases that suggest that
constitutional protections should be afforded aliens who are tried
in United States courts.174
165. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wal-
lace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353).
166. Id. at 1235-36 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1236 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1237 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (quoting Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)).
170. Id. at 1240 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1241 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
174. Wallace distinguished cases granting aliens fifth and sixth amendment
rights because those amendments ensure fairness in the trial process itself. Id. at
1241. He dismissed the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Peterson, 812
F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987), which discussed the extraterritorial application of the Con-
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Wallace also concludes that the evidence obtained in the
search of Verdugo-Urquidez's home cannot be suppressed on any
grounds other than a fourth amendment challenge. He rejects the
Second Circuit's conclusion in United States v. Toscanino175 that
the Bill of Rights prevents the government from "exploit[ing] the
fruits of its unlawful conduct in a criminal proceeding against [an]
alien in the United States."76 He reasons that Toscanino
"presented a unique fact situation" involving allegations of tor-
ture177 and that in the later case Lujan v. Gengler178 the Second
Circuit admitted that its ruling in Toscanino was influenced by the
outrageousness of the government's conduct. 179 Thus, while the
"shock the conscience" test might work to suppress evidence in a
"proper case," it does not apply to the search of Verdugo-
Urquidez's home because that search did not involve outrageous
conduct by United States agents.1S0 Finally, Wallace analyzes
whether the district court possessed the "inherent supervisory
power" to suppress the evidence seized.'ls He concludes that be-
cause courts have no authority to impose the exclusionary rule un-
less there is a fourth amendment violation, the suppression of
evidence through supervisory power is inappropriate in this
stitution. Because Peterson involved American citizens, the court assumed the
fourth amendment applied, and the misconduct was excused under the "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d
1214, 1241 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741
(1989) (No. 88-1353). Wallace dismissed suggestions in cases that aliens might have
standing to challenge violations of fourth and fifth amendments as "mere dictum."
Id. at 1241-42 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (citing Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 915-
17 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 973 (11th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)). Wallace distinguished cases involving searches on the
high seas because they "raise unique questions of sovereigty." Id. at 1242 (Wallace,
J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 866 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
910 (1981)). He distinguished a Ninth Circuit case granting alien plaintiffs standing
to challenge the constitutionality of a Warsaw Convention provision because aliens
given a right to sue in the U.S. should also "have standing to object to statutes that
deprive them of damages." The violations occurred in the U.S. and the "fifth
amendment would not permit 'the application of different rules of decision to resi-
dents and nonresidents suing on the same cause of action in the same court.'" Id.
at 1243 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April
22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982)).
175. 500 F.2d 267, 286 (2d Cir. 1974).
176. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1243 (Wallace, J., dissenting), cert. granted
109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353).
177. Id. at 1244 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
178. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
179. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wal-
lace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353) (citing Lujan,
510 F.2d at 65-66).
180. Id. at 1245 (Wallace, J., dissenting).




Wallace also sees the majority's imposition of a warrant re-
quirement for foreign searches as troublesome for four other rea-
sons. First, it conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent.' 8 3 Second,
such a requirement forces judges to issue advisory opinions in vio-
lation of article III of the Constitution. 184 Third, it "breaches the
separation-of-powers between the judicial and executive branches
of our government." 8 5 Fourth, it "ignores" the fact the foreign of-
ficials control how foreign searches are conducted.' 8 6
One can attack the Verdugo-Urquidez dissent on several
grounds. Even if one accepts the view that only those persons who
are parties to the "constitutional contract" may invoke constitu-
tional protections, one can still argue that an alien being prose-
cuted in a United States court has become a party to that contract
and thus deserves the protection of the fourth amendment's exclu-
sionary rule. A criminal defendant in United States court is, in ef-
fect, consenting to the rule of the United States government. The
defendant must accept the decision of a United States court, and, if
convicted, must serve time in a United States prison. Under these
circumstances, the defendant has been forced to accept certain ob-
ligations toward the United States government. He has essentially
become a party to the constitutional contract. 8 7 As the Verdugo-
Urquidez dissent concedes, alien defendants who are tried in the
United States must be afforded fifth and sixth amendment protec-
tions.'8 8 It follows that fourth amendment protections should also
be extended to aliens.
The dissent's wholesale reliance on a contractual view of the
United States Constitution is also misplaced. As the majority
points out, all previous Supreme Court rulings on this issue either
fail to address the extraterritorial application of the Constitution
182. Id. at 1247 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1248-49 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Peterson, 812
F.2d 486, 490-92 (9th Cir. 1987) (warrant not required for foreign searches)). In Pe-
terson, however, the search was a wiretap conducted by Philippine authorities, not
by U.S. agents. The court ruled that U.S. agents should not be held to a "strict lia-
bility standard for failings of their foreign associates." Peterson, 812 F.2d at 492.
184. Wallace expresses concern that because a warrant can have no effect in a
foreign country, its issuance would be an advisory opinion. United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1249 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353).
185. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting). The executive branch traditionally controls
the behavior of U.S. government agents abroad. Id.
186. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
187. See Bruce Bryan, The Constitutional Rights of Nonresident Aliens Prose-
cuted in the United States, 3 Fordham Int'l L.J. 221, 232 (1980).
188. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1237 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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or have been overruled.189 The historical evidence, while provid-
ing some support for either a contractual or natural rights view of
the Constitution, does not conclusively support either position.
Given this ambiguity and lack of Supreme Court precedent, con-
tract theory does not preclude extension of the Constitution to
aliens abroad.
The dissent also attaches much importance to the "locus" of
the government action in this case.190 Wallace concludes that the
fact that the government misconduct occurred outside the United
States bars extension of the Constitution to the search.191 Such a
view, however, ignores the rejection of such strict territoriality in
Reid v. Covert.192 Given the Supreme Court's rejection of territo-
riality in Reid, the locus of the government misconduct has little if
any significance.
Finally, the dissent misinterprets the Second Circuit's limita-
tion on the holding in Toscanino as explained in Lujan.193 As the
dissent admits, in Lujan, the Second Circuit only addressed the is-
sue of whether government misconduct could divest the district
court of jurisdiction over an alien.194 The court interpreted Tos-
canino as standing for the proposition that government miscon-
duct must be outrageous to divest the court of this jurisdiction.195
The dissent acknowledges that the Lujan court did not address the
fourth amendment issue raised in Toscanino.196 Thus, though the
dissent refuses to acknowledge it, the Toscanino holding that
fourth amendment protection does extend to aliens abroad sur-
vives the Lujan ruling.
The Verdugo-Urquidez majority chooses not to rely on Tos-
canino or a basic fairness argument in holding that fourth amend-
ment protections extend to aliens abroad. Instead, the majority
points out that because the Constitution has been extended over-
seas, 197 constitutional protections have been extended to aliens,
both legal and illegal, in the United States,198 and a contractual
view of the Constitution is of dubious validity,199 there is no valid
189. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
194. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wal-
lace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353).
195. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
197. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 126-138 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 109-124 and accompanying text.
1989]
Law and Inequality
reason not to extend the Constitution to aliens abroad as well.200
Given that the Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue, this is
a valid interpretation of ambiguous precedent.
While the Verdugo-Urquidez majority cites a number of rea-
sons for extending fourth amendment protections to aliens abroad,
there are additional arguments for extending such constitutional
protections to aliens abroad. Both the changing role of United
States courts in prosecuting aliens and a growing awareness of
United States responsibilities abroad call for extending fourth
amendment protections to foreign searches by United States
agents when the defendant alien is to be prosecuted in the United
States.
III. Indirect Effects on the Use of the Exclusionary Rule in
Prosecutions of United States Citizens
Refusing to extend the protections of the fourth amendment
to non-resident aliens who are prosecuted in United States courts
may indirectly contribute to the erosion of fourth amendment pro-
tections for United States citizens. The federal government is
pouring millions of dollars into increased drug enforcement both
in the United States and abroad.201 Increased enforcement and in-
terdiction will lead to increased foreign operations involving
United States agents. These operations will inevitably include ar-
rests of foreign nationals, searches on foreign soil, and more trials
of foreign nationals in the United States. Denial of fourth amend-
ment protections to these aliens may have an indirect effect on
protection of United States citizens in United States courts, and
may reduce the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule.
As United States drug enforcement activity in foreign coun-
tries increases, cases that do not allow use of the exclusionary rule
to suppress evidence may very well alter domestic behavior.
Though the search occurs in a foreign country, the denial of the
exclusionary rule will occur in a United States court. This denial
further contributes to an erosion of the exclusionary rule in the
United States by legitimizing the current movement toward
"deconstitutionalizing" the rule, illustrated most blatantly by the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Leon.20 2 In Leon, the
Court ruled that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created rem-
edy, and that therefore the failure to apply the rule to unconstitu-
200. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989) (No. 88-1353).
201. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, at 21, col. 1.
202. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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tionally obtained evidence is not a violation of the fourth
amendment. 203 This rationale allowed the Court to carve out a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule that applies when a
police officer acts in good faith reliance on a warrant.204
This ruling has been criticized on several grounds.205 One of
these criticisms is that the devaluation of the exclusionary rule
will tempt the Court to extend the Leon rationale (that the exclu-
sion of illegally obtained evidence is not required by the Constitu-
tion) to allow warrantless searches based on the individual police
officer's own reasonable belief that probable cause exists.206 These
criticisms reflect the fear that devaluation of the exclusionary rule
in the name of expediency will simply lead to further devaluations
and eventually toll a "heavy price" on society in the form of lost
liberty.207
The denial of fourth amendment protection to aliens would
further signal an erosion of the legitimacy of the exclusionary rule
in the cause of expediency. There might be little to worry about if
the number of trials of aliens remained small. As one commenta-
tor has argued, constitutional protections need not be afforded
aliens because misconduct by United States agents abroad has lit-
tle chance of increasing the possibility of misconduct against
United States citizens at home. "Physical separation from our
country, lesser notoriety, and the fact that government personnel
generally are compartmentalized along foreign/domestic lines all
tend to prevent 'infection' of domestic government behavior by
foreign misconduct." 208 But given increased international drug en-
forcement activities, the number of trials of aliens is likely to grow
and the risk of "infection" will increase as well.
Furthermore, denial of protection to aliens will reduce the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court con-
siders deterrence to be the most important result of the exclusion-
ary rule.209 This deterrent effect would be considerably blunted if
DEA officers were allowed to conduct illegal searches abroad but
were prevented from conducting similar searches in the United
203. Id. at 906.
204. Id. at 926.
205. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928-60 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Wayne LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency" United States v.
Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 895 (1984).
206. Leon, 468 U.S. at 959 (Brennan, J., dissenting); LaFave, supra note 205, at
930.
207. Leon, 468 U.S. at 959 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. Stephan, supra note 91, at 784.
209. Leon, 468 U.S. at 909.
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States.210 How are the officers to learn the "rules" if those rules
are in conflict? The desirability of deterrence counsels for a con-
sistent rule.
The risks of further erosion of the exclusionary rule are ex-
acerbated by current attitudes toward the rule, illustrated by re-
cent congressional efforts to improve drug enforcement. One of
the most serious social problems of the last decade has been the
explosion of drug abuse and trafficking in this country.21 1 The
political reaction to this problem, while for the most part well-in-
tentioned, has often emphasized short-term solutions at the ex-
pense of personal freedom and civil liberties.2 12
Recent debate in Congress over a major drug bill reflects this
growing resentment toward the exclusionary rule. The bill, H.R.
5210, as it passed the House of Representatives, contained a provi-
sion which would have extended the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule developed in United States v. Leon 2 13 to all
searches conducted in "an objective, reasonable, good faith belief"
that the search was in conformity with the fourth amendment.2 14
This provision, which was offered by Representative Lungren as
an amendment to H.R. 5210,215 was characterized by opponents in
debate on the House floor as "a wholesale assault on the Constitu-
tion." 216 The provision would have allowed the admission of evi-
dence that was obtained through a warrantless search if the police
210. The DEA has both domestic and international operations. N.Y. Times, Aug.
24, 1980, § 4, at 4, col. 5.
211. See generally Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Excep-
tion" to the Bill of Rights, 38 Hastings L.J. 889 (1987).
212. Id. at 925. One bill introduced in Congress even suggested eliminating the
exclusionary rule altogether. H.R. 4259, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. 17,251
(1981).
213. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
214. H.R. 5210, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3408, 134 Cong. Rec. H7299 (daily ed. Sept.
8, 1988). The full text of the exclusionary rule provision read:
§ 6801 LIMITATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLU-
SIONARY RULE.
(a) IN GENERAL-Chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
§ 3508. Limitation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
Except as specifically provided by law, evidence which is obtained as a
result of a search or seizure and which is otherwise admissible shall
not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United States if the
search or seizure was undertaken in an objective, reasonable, good
faith belief that it was in conformity with the fourth amendment to
the Constitution. A showing that the evidence was obtained pursuant
to and within the scope of a warrant consitutes prima facie evidence of
such an objective, reasonable, good faith belief, unless the warrant was
obtained through ihtentional and material misrepresentation.
Id.
215. Id. (statement of Rep. Lungren).
216. Id. at H7302 (statement of Rep. Rodino).
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could later prove their "good faith" in attempting to conform with
the fourth amendment. The provision thus ignored the interests
protected by search warrant requirements and would have allowed
the police to justify a warrantless search by reconstructing the
facts after the search had occurred, thus creating an incentive for
police officers to search indiscriminately and later make up facts
to justify the search. 217 Apparently the nearness of election day
weighed more heavily on the House's collective mind than the
threat to constitutional protections. The Lungren amendment
passed the House by a 259-134 vote.2 18 But in the less politically-
charged atmosphere of the House-Senate Conference Committee,
the Lungren provision was cut from the bill, and therefore the
provision was not included in the final version of the bill.219
Though the emasculation of the exclusionary rule repre-
sented by the Lungren amendment was eventually rejected, the
fact that it passed the House of Representatives by a wide margin
is ample evidence of the disdain with which the rule is held by leg-
islators and the general public. Given the current hysteria over
drugs, there are many temptations to give less than full effect to
the exclusionary rule in the area of drug enforcement. To deny the
rule's protections to aliens being tried in this country's courts
would add to those temptations by further devaluing fourth
amendment protections.
IV. Controlling Behavior of United States Agents Abroad
Applying the exclusionary rule to foreign searches by United
States agents would help temper misconduct by United States
agents abroad. The exclusionary rule's main purpose is to deter
misconduct by government agents. 220 Drug agents should not be
allowed to take advantage of searches that would be unconstitu-
tional if conducted in the United States. To allow such searches
would encourage drug agents to go on "fishing expeditions," ran-
sacking the homes of innocent suspects. While applying the exclu-
sionary rule to such searches would not provide a remedy to the
innocent, it would deter United States agents from conducting ille-
gal searches in the first place and would encourage searches of
only legitimate suspects. 221
Controlling the behavior of agents abroad would also improve
217. Id. at H7303 (statement of Rep. Rodino).
218. Id. at H7304.
219. 134 Cong. Rec. H11,243 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Jeffords);
see also 134 Cong. Rec. S17,303 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1988) (statement of Senator Dole).
220. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-909 (1984).
221. Loewy, supra note 11, at 1266-67.
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United States relations with other countries and promote demo-
cratic values around the world. In turn, major United States for-
eign policy goals would be fostered. Preventing aliens on trial in
United States courts from asserting rights held by United States
citizens is akin to saying those aliens are not as worthy of protec-
tion. This only serves to confirm the beliefs held by many foreign
governments and citizens that the United States sees itself as supe-
rior to all other nations and that United States citizens are some-
how more important than all other citizens. Granting fourth
amendment rights to aliens would also help the United States
avoid confrontations with countries whose citizens are being tried
in United States courts. If aliens are allowed all the rights granted
United States citizens in United States courts, it is likely that their
home countries will be more amenable to allowing the prosecution
of their citizens in the United States. Those countries will also be
more likely to join forces with the United States in the drug in-
terdiction effort if they know their citizens will be fairly treated if
prosecuted in the United States.
Finally, allowing aliens fourth amendment protection in
United States courts will promote democracy abroad. What better
way to encourage democratic change than to hold up our own Con-
stitution as a model for other governments to follow? Moreover,
what view of our Constitution are other countries getting if United
States courts allow United States government agents to ransack
homes without warrants and use the evidence with impunity?
Such activity leads to a distorted view of the United States which
will not attract freedom-lovers to our cause. Instead, such a view is
more likely to attract tyrants.
Thus, there are several important policy arguments for ex-
tending protection to aliens. In combination with an expansive,
natural rights view of the Constitution, these policy arguments
counsel for judicial recognition of the fourth amendment rights of
aliens abroad.
V. Conclusion
The Verdugo-Urquidez court did not consider the effect of
denying protection to aliens abroad on the erosion of the effective-
ness of the exclusionary rule in the United States, on United
States foreign policy, or on the promotion of democratic values
worldwide when it found that the exclusionary rule acts to sup-
press evidence obtained in an illegal search conducted outside the
United States when the suspect is a non-resident alien being tried
in a United States court. But these policy arguments provide fur-
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ther evidence of why the "constitutional contract" view of our
Constitution is too restrictive when it denies that there are "cer-
tain inalienable rights" that are afforded all persons, whether
United States citizen or not.
This article does not attempt to define what those inalienable
rights are or under what circumstances they must be recognized.
However, this article does demonstrate that fourth amendment
rights should be afforded to an alien being tried in a United States
court. Perhaps the most important and most compelling reason
for allowing fourth amendment protections to aliens tried in
United States courts is the simplest and most obvious reason of all:
simple fairness. Recall the two hypotheticals that began this arti-
cle. Putting all constitutional and political analysis aside, one is
left with a simple fact-the place of one's residence may decide the
kind of justice one can get in a United States court. Such a result
is unjust and demeans the judicial process. In a country that
prides itself on the motto "equal justice under law," such a result
is unacceptable. When one also considers that application to aliens
will protect the exclusionary rule from erosion, control behavior of
United States agents abroad, improve United States relations with
other countries, and promote democratic ideals worldwide, such a
result is also bad policy.
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